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a Utah Corporation, 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Mortgage foreclosure suit. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
District Court granted summary judgment foreclos 
ing mortgage. 
Case No. 
13925 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Vacating of summary judgment and remanding of 
the case for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although this case was filed in Tooele County Court, 
by agreement between the parties the hearing of the 
motion for summary judgment was heard by Judge 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. in Salt Lake County. In his 
affidavit in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary 
Judgment (R. 14, Par. 5 & 6) Mr. Stoker referred the 
Court to cases 201,206, 201,278, 202,577 and 204,255 pend-
ing in the District Court of Salt Lake County, to the suit 
for an accounting pending in those actions, which ac-
counting involves the note and mortgage sued on herein, 
asserted that said accounting suits must be concluded 
before the amount of indebtedness of Stoker Motor 
Company to Plaintiff in this action could be determined, 
and that the note and mortgage which are the subject 
matter of this lawsuit were executed subject to a later 
accounting between the parties to determine the actual 
amount of the indebtedness. Stoker Motor Co. alleges 
that it is entitled to an accounting and that the credits 
due per that accounting equals or exceeds the amounts 
claimed by Plaintiff. (R. 9). 
The entire files in cases 201,206, 201,278, 202,577 and 
204,255 were presented to the Court at the hearing of 
the motion for summary judgment. The Court can also 
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take judicial notice of facts appearing in it's files. See 
Utah Rule of Evidence 9 and 9(2) (e) ; Warren v. Robin-
son, 21 U. 429, 61 P. 28. 
Plaintiff and an affiliated corporation, Freed In-
vestment Company, provided a line of credit for Stoker 
Motor Company, an automobile agency, over an extend-
ed period ending about November, 1969, when the line 
of credit was terminated. Stoker Motor Company, it's 
officers and affiliated companies executed various notes, 
mortgages, security instruments, etc. and pledged or 
mortgaged certain reserves for losses held by Plaintiff, 
certain real and personal property, securities, etc. as 
security for the obligations created in connection with 
the hundreds of transactions that occurred between the 
parties prior to termination of the line of credit. No 
accounting has been accomplished between the parties, 
nor has the amount of the endebtedness between the 
parties, if any, been determined. The note and mortgage 
which are the subject matter of this lawsuit were ex-
ecuted as a part of the various transactions involved in 
said line of credit and were executed subject to said later 
accounting betwen the parties (R. 14, Par. 5 & 6). 
Plaintiff and it's affiliate, Freed Investment Com-
pany, commenced the following lawsuits based upon said 
notes, accounts, guarantees, mortgages, etc. in the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, and in each of those 
cases Stoker Motor Company asserted it's right to an 
accounting; 
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Nature of claim 
replevin action for boat pur-
chased by Caldwell and alleged-
ly guaranteeed by Stoker Motor 
Company and others 
201,278 9- 9-71 Suit on promissory notes for 
$6,866.94 and $13,129.75. 
202,577 11-23-71 Suit on promissory note for 
$10,798.26. 
204,255 3 -2-72 Suit on promissory note for 
$25,000.00 and to foreclose chat-
tel mortgage. 
Defendants in their answers in these cases alleged 
that they were entitled to an accounting of the transac-
tions between the parties, and in answers to interroga-
tories (filed Nov. 6, 1972, case #204,255) asserted that 
an accounting was necessary to identify all payments, 
offsets and claims and amounts to which defendants 
were entitled, but asserted among other things that they 
believed that Stoker Motor Company was entitled to 
credits as follows: 
(a) That credit had not been properly and fully 
allowed for the $400,000.00 note which is the 
subject matter of this lawsuit (claim that only 
$4,000.00 credit had been allowed for that note 
— see exhibit 11 atached to plaintiffs answers 
to interrogatories in case #204,255). 
(b) Claim that approximately $50,000.00 dealer re-
serve held by Plaintiff has not been credited. 
(c) Claim for accounting of securities delivered to 
Case* Date Filed 
#201,206 9- 3-71 
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Plaintiff, including credits for proceeds of sale 
and for value of unsold securities held by 
plaintiff. 
(d) Claim for $100,000.00 credit under written con-
tract for services in assisting plaintiff in ob-
taining possession of yacht. 
(e) Claim of credit for $32,000.00 due for convey-
ance of real property to Plaintiff. 
(f) Claim credit for $60,000.00 funds not advanced 
on loan. 
(g) Claimed credit for $39,745.20 in connection 
with sale of aircraft pledged as security for 
obligations to Plaintiff. 
(h) Claimed credit of $150,000.00 paid to Plaintiff 
for letter of credit to be issued by Plaintiff 
which was not used. 
( i ) Claimed credit for $11,000.00 currency paid to 
plaintiff. 
(j) Claimed credit for automobiles of Defendant's 
subsidiary, O'Bannon Auto Sales, taken by 
Plaintiff but believed to have not been credited 
by Plaintiff. 
(k) Claimed credit for alleged conversion by Plain-
tiff of stock of Baltra, S.A. Value alleged as 
approximately $900,000.00. 
(1) Claimed credit of $210,000.00 for 120 acres of 
land conveyed to Plaintiff as security for ob-
ligations and not foreclosed. 
(m) Claim that Defendant is entitled to an account-
ing to determine accuracy of balance of $705,-
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885.41 brought forward by Plaintiff in it's ac-
counting (Exhibit 11 to Plaintiffs answers to 
interrogatories filed 7-28-72 in case #204,255). 
Those cases were ordered consolidated by the Court 
and a master was appointed by the court to accomplish 
an accounting. (See order filed 1-11-73 in cases #202,577, 
201,278, 201,206, and 204,255). In that order the Honor-
able G. Hal Taylor stated in part as follows: 
"Because of the extremely complex nature of 
the accounting required to resolve various issues 
of fact in the aforesaid consolidated actions the 
Court pursuant to Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil procedure hereby appoints the firm of Willard 
G. Smith of Haynie, Tebbs & Smith, C.P.A.'s, to act 
as Special Masters in the consolidated actions and 
directing the Special Masters to obtain from the 
representatives of both the plaintiff and the de-
fendant any and all information necessary to fully 
audit the books and records of the parties with re-
ference to any matters relevant and material to the 
above transactions. The Master shall then prepare 
a report of their findings, serve a copy on all parties 
to the action and file such with the above-entitled 
Court. . . ." 
No further action has been taken to complete that 
accounting or to bring those four cases to trial. The 
responsibility for payment of the master was imposed 
upon Plaintiff under the terms of said order of Judge 
Taylor (indentified above). 
The parties thereafter about July 31, 1973, entered 
into a compromise agreement, a copy of which is at-
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tached to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (R. 
12), wherein the parties, among others things, recited 
that approximately $56,000.00 was owed by Stoker to 
Plaintiff on various notes and accounts listed therein, 
and that there was a promissory note "outstanding" 
"in the original principal amount of $400,000.00;" agreed 
that the $56,000.00 obligation could be satisfied by pay-
ing approximately $28,00.00 plus interst, to be paid in 
installments, and that the $400,000.00 note could be set-
tled by paying $125,000.00 plus interest in installments. 
Plaintiff reserved it's rights against Caldwell (Par. 4), 
obtained a waiver by Stoker of it's right to credit for 
Arizona property conveyed to Plaintiff by Stoker [item 
(e), page 5 above) (Par. #6), but left unresolved all of 
the other claims, credits, offsets and defenses asserted 
by Stoker in it's answer herein, (R. 9) in the Salt Lake 
County cases (itemized in paragraphs (a) thru (d) and 
(e) thru (m), page 4 and 5 above). It is important to ob-
serve that the July 31, 1973, agreement releases Freeds' 
claims against Stoker but contains no release by Stoker 
of said claims against Freeds. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JULY 31, 1973, AGREEMENT IS NOVATION 
AND PRECLUDES SUIT ON NOTE 
It is clear that the agreement of July 31, 1973, was 
intended to compromise and settle the claims asserted 
by Plaintiff against Stoker in this case, as well as Plain-
tiffs' claims in the four Salt Lake County cases. Ac-
cordingly, that agreement constitutes a novation and an 
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action can thereafter only be maintained, for breach of 
that contract, the rights of Plaintiff under the original 
$400,000.00 note and mortgage attached to Plaintiffs 
complaint herein having been extinguished and/or 
merged into the July 31, 1973, agreement. See 58 Am. 
Jur. 2d Sec. 12 and cases there cited; Mackelprang v. 
Mackelprang,A26 P.2d 10, 19 U. (2d) 63. 
That the July 31, 1973, agreement was intended to 
replace or to merge the claims of Freeds against Stoker 
is further demonstrated by the language of that agree-
ment, which agreement provides for the payment of 
attorney fees in the event of default by either party (R. 
12, Par. 9 of agreement); and provides the following 
remedy to Plaintiff (Freeds) in the event of default by 
Stokers. (Par. # 1) : 
". . . in the event of a default and failure to 
remedy said default in accordance with the terms 
of paragraph 3 hereof, the full unpaid balance as 
reflected by the terms hereof shall be due and pay-
able, and FREEDS shall have the option to declare 
the same in default and STOKERS agree to pay the 
unpaid balance thereof in accordance herewith. . . !y 
In paragraph #7 of the Freed Affidavit in support of 
the motion for summary judgment (R. 16) Freed states 
that Plaintiff exercised that option. Accordingly, if 
Plaintiff has a claim against Defendant it would be for 
the unpaid balance owed on the $56,030.00 and $125,000.00 
settlement amounts provided in the July 31, 1973, agree-
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ment, which precludes Plaintiff's lawsuit based upon the 
original $400,000.00 note which has been extinguished 
and replaced by that agreement. 
In the event that Plaintiff disputes that construc-
tion of the July 31, 1973, agreement, then obviously said 
agreement is ambiguous and a trial is necessary to re-
solve that ambiguity, thereby precluding summary judg-
ment. 
In the event that Plaintiff contends that it has a right 
to elect the remedy contained in paragraph #3 of the 
July 31, 1973, agreement (to declare that agreement 
void), then an issue of fact remains which requires a 
trial to determine whether or not Plaintiff by service of 
the notice mentioned in paragraph #7 of the Affidavit of 
Freed (R. 16) elected the remedy contained in para-
graph # 1 , thereby precluding a lawsuit based upon the 
original note and mortgage, see Estate Counseling Ser-
vice, inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
(CA10 Utah) 303 F2d 527; Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor 
Co., 69 U. 161, 253 P. 196; Kennedy v. Griffith, 68 U. 183, 
95 P.2d 752. 25 A.J. 2d Election of Remedies Sec. 8, P. 652. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT AWARDED 
The July 31, 1973, agreement acknowledges that 
Plaintiff is holding various securities as security for the 
performance of that agreement and that Defendant is 
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entitled to credit for proceeds should the securities be 
sold and to return of unsold securities when the obliga-
tion was paid (R. 12., Par. 7 of attached agreement). 
That agreement also provides for the payment of $2,-
000.00 at the time of execution with monthly payments 
thereafter of $1,500.00 or more. No credit appears to 
have been allowed for the payments made pursuant to 
the July 31, 1973, agreement, (Freed acknowledges that 
payments were made in par. #6 of his affidavit R. 16) 
or for in excess of $23,000.00 which appears to have been 
paid previously on the $400,000.00 note (see case #202,-
577, Exhibit 1 attached to Freed's answers to interroga-
tories filed about 7-28-72). No affidavit or other docu-
ment was filed by Plaintiff from which the amount of 
the claimed indebtedness could be determined by the 
Court, thereby precluding the granting of summary 
judgment. It appears that the judgment was entered 
for the full amount of the $400,000.00 note plus accrued 
interest from the date of the note without allowing any 
credits. The record simply does not support the judg-
ment. 
The judgment also includes $30,000.00 attorney fees. 
No hearing was held concerning the amount of attorney 
fees, if any, to be awarded, and no affidavits or other 
information were filed from which the Court could de-
termine what amount, if any, should be awarded. Since 
the record is devoid of any sworn testimony which would 
support the award of judgment for $400,000.00 or attor-
ney fees of $30,000.00, those judgments must be reversed. 
See Aiken v. Burrows, 30 U.(2d) 116, 514 P.2d 533. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
POINT III 
UNRESOLVED ACCOUNTING PRECLUDES 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant's seventh defense (R. 9) asserts that De-
fendant is entitled to offsets for finance reserves of 
Defendant held by Plaintiff, for securities, assets, and 
property of Defendant held by Plaintiff, with interest 
thereon, and to an accounting of the transactions be-
tween the parties, and alleges that such an accounting 
establish that credits due to Defendant would be equal 
to or in excess of the amounts claimed by Plaintiff. The 
affidavit of Stoker (R. 14, Par. 5 & 6) refers to the Salt 
Lake County cases mentioned in the statement of facts 
(above) and to the accounting ordered by the Court in 
those cases of the transactions between the parties, and 
asserts that the note and mortgage which are the subject 
matter of this lawsuit are involved in that accounting. 
The note and mortgage sued upon in this matter are in 
fact a part of the accounting involved in those Salt Lake 
County cases. See Plaintiff's (Freeds) answers to inter-
rogatories in case #204,255 filed about July 28, 1972, and 
in particular paragraph 4(e) thereof, and exhibits 1, 11, 
13, etc. attached thereto. See also items concerning 
which Stoker has not yet received the accounting or-
dered by Judge Taylor and as detailed by Stoker's an-
swers to interrogatories in case #204,255 (filed Nov. 6, 
1972), and as summarized on page 4 and 5 of statement of 
facts (above), items (a) thru (m). 
If Plaintiff is entitled to maintain an action on the 
original $400,000.00 note and mortgage, then that claim 
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is subject to completion of the accounting ordered by 
Judge Taylor so as to determine what amount, if any, 
remains unpaid on the note. Defendant is entitled to 
credit for such amount as is determined by the account-
ing. The affidavit of Freed (R. 16, Par. 6) that "Plain-
tiff is not indebted to Stoker Motor Company" is wholly 
insufficient to justify the granting of summary judg-
ment since that statement constitutes a conclusion and 
the affidavit does not affirmatively show that Freed was 
competent to testify on that subject as required by Rule 
56(e), URCP. See also Preston v. Lamb, 20 U.(2d) 260 
436 P.2d 1021; Rainford v. Rytting, 22 U. (2d) 252, 451 
P.2d 769. 
This is particular^ true in our situation where there 
has been an express finding by Judge Taylor that the 
issues of fact between an express finding by Judge Tay-
lor that the issues of fact between the parties creates an 
"extremely complex . . . accounting3' problem which 
required the appointment of a master. (See page 6 
above). The affidavit of Stoker (R. 14) disputes the af-
fidavit of Freed and creates an issue of fact which re-
quires a trial and precludes summary judgment, as do 
the Salt Lake County cases, the files concerning which 
are included in the record in this matter and were pre-
sented to the Court for consideration in connection with 
the motion for summary judgment. 
Since disputed issues of fact exist which, if resolved 
in favor of Defendant, would entitled Defendant to pre-
vail or to reduce the amount of the judgment awarded, 
the granting of summary judgment in this matter was 
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improper, and the summary judgmen should be vacated 
and the case remanded to complete the accounting and 
for trial. DAV v. Hendrixson, 9. (2d) 152, 340 P.2d 416; 
Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance Co., 20 U.(2d) 156, 434 
P.2d 758. All disputed issues of fact should, for purposes 
of this appeal, be considered in the manner most favor-
able to Appellant. Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 U. 
(2d) 30, 395 P.2d 62; Green v. Gam, 11 U.(2d) 375, 359 
P.2d 1050; Richard v. Anderson, 9 U.(2d)17, 19, 337 P.2d 
59; In re Williams Estate, 10 U.2d) 83, 348 P.2d 683; 
Dupler v. Yeates, 10 U. (2d) 251, 351 P.2d 624. The Court 
should have considered all evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the min determining whether or 
not issues of fact remain which require a trial. See 
Bullock v. Deseret Truck Center, Inc., 11 U. (2d) 1, 354 
P.2d 559. The Court cannot weigh the evidence on a mo-
tion for summary judgment as appears to have been done 
in our case, since that is for a jury at a trial if there is 
conflicting evidence or disputes as to the construction 
or effect of instruments such as the July 31, 1973, agree-
ment which appears to have been the basis of the sum-
mary judgment. Singleton v. Alexander, 19 P. (2d) 292, 
431 P.2d 126. 
POINT IV 
THE JULY 31, 1973, AGREEMENT DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN ADMISSION THAT THE 
ENTIRE $400,000.00 FACE AMOUNT OF THE 
NOTE IS OWED 
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (R. 12) is 
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based primarily upon the alleged admissions contained 
in the July 31, 1973, agreement, Plaintiff asserting that 
said agreement constitutes an admission that the entire 
$400,000.00 note is in fact owed by Defendants (Plain-
tiffs memorandum of authorities, R. 15, Par. 3). Plain-
tiff simply misreads that agreement. The agreement 
simply acknowledges that a promissory note is "out-
standing" which had an "original principal amount of 
$400,000.00/' There is no acknowledgement in that 
agreement as to the amount remaining unpaid on that 
note, as to the defenses or offsets available to Defendant 
as defenses thereto, and there is no waiver of those de-
fenses (except as to the offset for the Arizona Land — 
see par. (e) of that agreement — R. 12), or statement 
that in the event of default that the entire $400,000.00 
would be owed. The reduction from $412,175.80 plus 
costs and attorney fees included in the judgment (R. 19) 
to the $125,000.00 provided in the July 31, 1973, agree-
ment indicates that there is substance to the defenses 
and offsets asserted by Stoker. Because Stoker default-
ed in making the payments under the July 31, 1973, 
agreement does not entitled Plaintiff to recover more 
than $287,000.00 (plus $30,000.00 attorney fees) more 
than the parties determined by that agreement to be 
owed. 
Paragraph #3 of the July 31, 1973, agreement, pro-
vides in part as follows: 
". . . In the event that the same (default by 
Stokers) is not corrected within sixty (60) days 
from notice thereof, then this agreement to be of 
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no further force and effect and the original amounts 
set forth herein shall be due and payable, together 
with attorney's fees." (R. 12, Par. #3 of attached 
agreement). 
Obviously the foregoing provision is in direct con-
flict with the provisions in paragraph #1 thereof (dis-
cussed in page 8 above), which provides that the un-
paid balance owed on the settlement amount provided 
by that agreement would be accelerated with attorney 
fees for enforcement. Since the contract was drafted by 
counsel for Plaintiff and the ambiguous wording was 
selected by Plaintiff that ambiguity should be most 
strongly construed against Plaintiff. See Skousen v. 
Smith, 493 P.2d 1003, 37 U.(2d); Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16 
U(2d) 323, 400 P.2d 503; General Mills v. Cragun, 103 
U. 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (especially as in our case where 
draftsman is lender of money); Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 
28 U(2d) 231, 500 P.2d 10007 (forfeiture). 
If that language means what it purports to say, (and 
the contrary language in paragraph #1 is disregarded) 
then the entire agreement of July 31, 1973, is void and 
the parties are then left in the same position as they 
would have been in had that agreement not been exe-
cuted. Under those circumstances since the note which 
is the subject matter of this lawsuit is involved in the 
accounting ordered by the Court in the Salt Lake County 
cases (see discussion on page 7-9 above), and since a 
master was appointed by the Court to determine the ac-
counting "Because of the extremely complex nature of 
the accounting required to resolve various issues of 
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fact . . ", in the language of the order of Judge Taylor 
(see Page 6 above), which order was drafted by coun-
sel for Freeds (Filed about 1-11-73 in Salt Lake County 
cases). The filing and prosecution of this action without 
completing that accounting is a direct violation of the 
terms and spirit of the order appointing a master to 
accomplish an accounting in the Salt Lake County cases 
and by reason thereof the judgment entered herein 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial after 
completion of said accounting. That accounting involves 
a determination of the isues raised by Defendant's an-
swer and the Stoker claims detailed on page 4-5 above. 
Issues of fact raised by the accounting problem, off-
sets and credits claimed by Stoker and the amiguity 
concerning available remedies and effect of default in-
herent in the contract of July 31, 1973, requires a trial 
and precludes summary judgment. 
POINT V 
STOKER MOTOR COMPANY IS NOT BOUND 
BY THE NOTE, MORTGAGE OR AGREEMENT 
The affidavit of H. D. Stoker (R. 14) to the effect 
that no resolution of the board of directors or of the 
stockholders of Stoker Motor Company were asked for 
or obtained authorizing the execution of the promissory 
note, the mortgage or the agreement of July 31, 1973. 
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Plaintiff claims that Stoker Motor Company is estopped 
to assert the invalidity of those instruments (R. 15), 
however the record is insufficient to conclude that as a 
matter of law such an estoppel has occurred. 
16-10-33, UCA, 1953, provides in part as follows: 
". . . The business and affairs of a corporation 
shall be managed by the board of directors . . ." 
The president of a corporation ordinarily has only those 
powers that are directly conferred upon him by the 
board of directors. Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill. 
Co., 37 U. 349, 108 P. 1128. For example the president 
has no power to do such unusual acts as the selling of 
treasury stock. Copper King Min. Co. v. Hanson, 52 U. 
605, 176 P. 623. In the absence of provisions in the char-
ter or by-laws, the authority to mortgage corporate real 
estate is vested in the board of directors and no officer 
or agent has such authority by virtue solely his office 
or appointment. 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations Sec. 1153, 
1228 and 1533 and cases there cited. 
Plaintiff cites the case of Lumber Mart Company v. 
Buchanan, 419 P.2d 1002 (Wash.) in support of it's claim 
that Stoker as president of Stoker Motor Company had 
apparent authority to mortgage the corporate property 
(R. 15, Par. #2) which simply is not in point since that 
case involved the sale of building materials within the 
usual course and scope of the authority of a corporate 
officer. The property mortgaged by Stoker Motor Com-
pany constituted substantially all of the assets of that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
corporation (Stoker Affidavit R. 14 Par. #3) and is not 
within the usual course of scope of the authority of a 
corporate officer. Plaintiff also cites 16-10-6, UCA, 1953, 
as standing for the proposition that a conveyance is not 
invalid because of lack of capacity or power to make the 
conveyance. We do not contend that Stoker Motor Com-
pany was without power or authority to mortgage it's 
property and acknowledge that if such a mortgage had 
been authorized by the stockholders that it would be 
valid, however no such authorization was sought or ob-
tained (Stoker Affivadit, R. 14, par. #1) and accordingly 
the mortgage given is not the act of the corporation and 
it is not bound thereby. 
Sec. 16-10-73, UCA, 1953, requires that the mortgage 
of substantially all of the assets of the corporation in the 
usual course of business of the corporation be authorized 
by its board of directors, and 16-10-74, UCA, 1953, re-
quires that such a mortgage not made in the usual course 
of the business of the corporation be recommended to 
the stockholders by a resolution of the board of directors, 
and be adopted by a resolution of the stockholders. No 
authorization for the mortgage or agreement of July 31, 
1973, was obtained from either the stockholders or direc-
tors of Stoker Motor Company (R. 14). Plaintiff cites 
Grover v. Gam, 23 U. (2d) 441, 464 P.2d 598 and 
Amoss v. Bennion, 18 U. (2d) 251, 420 P.2d 47, as stand-
ing for the proposition that Stoker is bound by the mort-
gage without formal authorization from the stockhold-
ers or directors. Both of those cases had been tried (un-
like our case which involves summary judgment) and 
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both involved alter ego fact situations, thereby render-
ing the action of the officer to be that of the corporation. 
Plaintiff has not claimed alter ego in our case and no 
facts are before the court from which an alter ego situa-
tion could be inferred. The Plaintiff is a finance company 
which is knowledgeable about the necessity of obtaining 
authorization from the directors and stockholders to 
mortgage substantially all of a corporation's property, 
and was represented by an attorney in these transac-
tions. It would be dangerous precedent in corporate 
law to permit an officer to sell or to mortgage all of the 
corporate assets without specific authorization from the 
directors and stockholders. 
If Plaintiff claims that Soker Motor Company is the 
alter ego of H. D. Stoker then it should be required to 
plead and to prove facts which would support that 
theroy, which would require a trial and preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Four separate lawsuits were commenced in Salt 
Lake County Courts, each of which was defended claim-
ing offsets and requesting an accounting. The Salt Lake 
County Court appointed a master to accomplish that ac-
count, which accounting involved the promissory note 
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. The parties 
thereafter entered into a settlement agreement which 
provided for payment of only a small part of the 
amounts claimed in the Salt Lake County cases and 
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claimed under the note which is the subject matter of 
this lawsuit. Stoker defaulted in making payments on 
the settlement agreement and Freed then filed this law-
suit in Tooele County on the note and mortgage, and was 
granted summary judgment in the Tooele County Court 
without the master completing the accounting so as to 
determine what credits or offsets were available to 
Stoker. Stoker claims that the credits and offsets which 
would be shown by that account would substantially re-
duce or extinguish the claims of Freed in this lawsuit. 
Issues of fact remain unresolved concerning those offsets 
which preclude the granting of summary judgment and 
require a trial on the merits. This lawsuit is contrary to 
the order of the Salt Lake County Court appointing a 
master to complete that accounting which Judge Taylor 
found necessary in the Salt Lake County cases "Because 
of the extremely complex nature of the accounting re-
quired to resolve various issues of fact. . " (filed 1-11-73 
in Salt Lake County cases — see attachment to record 
herein). 
Other issues of fact which preclude the granting 
of summary judgment and which require a trial on the 
merits include: 
1. Whether or not the July 31, 1973, settlement 
agreement constituted a novation which extinguished 
the original note sued upon and limited Plaintiff's right 
to sue to a suit for breach of that agreement (see Point 
2. Whether or not the record before the court is 
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sufficient to support the judgment awarded, particularly 
in view of award of $30,000.00 attorney fees without any 
sworn testimony or affidavit in support thereof; without 
credit being allowed for over $23,000.00 paid on the note 
prior to the July 31, 1973, agreement, and without allow-
ing credit for payments made on the July 31, 1973, agree-
ment ($2,00.00 down and $1,500.00 per month for an in-
definite period), etc. (Point II). 
3. Whether or not the July 31, 1973, agreement 
constitutes an admission that the entire $400,000.00 note 
remained unpaid, when that agreement merely referred 
to the note as being "outstanding" and and states that 
he had an "original principal amount of $400,000.00." 
(Point IV). 
4. Whether or not the July 31, 1973, agreement is 
ambiguous as to the remedies available to Plaintiff in 
the event of default by Defendant, whether such am-
biguity should be construed strongly against Plaintiff 
since it was drafted by Plaintiff, and whether or not by 
it's actions Plaintiff elected to claim a breach of the July 
31, 1973, contract and thereby limited it's remedy to a 
suit for the unpaid balance of that contract, thereby 
precluding suit for several times that amount on the note. 
5. Whether or not Stoker Motor Company is the 
alter ego of H. D. Stoker so as to validate the note, mort-
gage and July 31, 1973, agreements without resolutions 
by the directors and/or stockholders. 
Stoker Motor Company has substantial defenses to 
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Plaintiff's claim. The fact that it defaulted in the per-
formance of the settlement agreement does not divest 
it of it's defenses or authorize Freed to recover judgment 
for several times the amounts actually due. Either the 
July 31, 1973, agreement is valid and Freeds are limited 
to suit on that contract for the unpaid balance plus at-
torney fees, or it is invalid and Freed can sue on the 
original obligation, subject to credit for the payments 
made and the defenses and offsets available to Stoker. 
The summary judgment as granted is wholly unfair and 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial on 
the merits. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
•''•'.- RONALD C. BARKER 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone 486-9636 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
Stoker Motor Company 
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